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 The Rhythmprint authentication combines an advantage of the traditional 
keystroke authentication and the multi-touch technology based on a 
touchable device such as touchpad on a laptop, a smartphone and a tablet. 
With the Rhythmprint authentication, the user is less likely to suffer from 
shoulder surfing and eavesdropping attacks. This research provides empirical 
evidence to verify the security performance of the Rhythmprint 
authentication comparing to the traditional keystroke authentication for 
shoulder surfing and eavesdropping attacks, when the user tries to login to a 
website on a laptop for 10 times in a public place while the attacker stands 
behind. The experimental results show that the Rhythmprint authentication 
provides higher security  than the traditional keystroke authentication in both 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The Rhythmprint authentication [1] is a novel method of a biometric authentication. It combines an 
advantage of the traditional keystroke authentication [2] and the multi-touch technology based on a touchpad 
on a laptop, a screen of a smartphone and related touchable devices. The Rhythmprint authentication research 
indicates that the user is less likely to suffer from shoulder surfing and eavesdropping attacks . Furthermore, 
the initial results show that the Rhythmprint authentication provides higher security than other related 
methods. This research is looking forward to comparing the security performance of the Rhythmprint 
authentication to the traditional keystroke authentication, in terms of shoulder surfing and eavesdropping 
attacks when the user tries to login to an application on laptop in a public place.  
The Rhythmprint authentication uses multi-touch technology for collecting the rhythm when the 
user touches a touchable device. Three measurements which consist of holding time, latency time and 
number of fingers per beat, are collected and used to create the user template.  When the user needs to login 
to a device, the user only needs to touch fingers on the touchable device with the registered rhythm. K-NN 
algorithm was used for classification. The attacker must perform shoulder surfing and eavesdropping attacks 
in order to attack the authentication. This is because the attacker must know two things : the rhythm and the 
number of fingers per beat. An eavesdropping attack hardly occurs because touching the finger on a device 
does not makes a loud sound. The algorithm of Rhythmprint authentication can be split into two modules, 
namely, registration module and authentication module. Figure 1 shows the registraition flowchart of 
Rhythmprint authentication and Figure 2 shows how authentication of the Rhythmprint authentication works.  
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Figure 2. The authentication module flowchart 
 
 
There are similar studies which use touchable devices to authenticate users. However, these studies  
have many weak points. PassChords [3] uses multi-touch technology to collect the number of fingers for each 
tap. Only four tabs are allowed. The user who needs to login to the device must touch four fingers on the 
screen of smartphone. The system identifies the positions of four fingers including point, middle, ring and 
little fingers. After that, the phone vibrates and the user can touch on the screen for authentication. 
PassChords only records the number of fingers per tab, which limits to four taps. Therefore, PassChords is 
not different from a traditional password authentication. Even worse, PassChords provides weaker security 
than a password since there are less combinations.  
In [4], Keystroke dynamics on android platform was proposed. This is a smartphone authentication 
by using password that is inputted using softkeys on a smartphone screen. Three measurements which 
include holding time, latency time and pressing pressure, are used to authenticate users . This method 
provides better security than using a password alone. However, it is not different from a traditional keystroke 
dyanamics. It only changes from a hardware keyboard to a virtual keyboard. The pressing pressure is not a 
suitable factor to use in real life, because the pressing pressure is different when the user is doing different 
activities.  
An extended pin authentication scheme allows multi-touch key input [5] using a PIN and multi-
touch technology on smartphones. They allow the user to use more than one finger when touching digit 
buttons on the screen. It is similar to the work in [4] but the scheme only uses a numeric virtual keyboard and 
adds multi-touch for keyboard input.  
Touch pad, Touch screen
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Development of a typing behavior recognition mechanism on Android and traditional keystroke [6] 
is just like a tradition keystroke, but it moves from hardware keyboard to smartphone screen, using three 
measurements: holding time, latency time and password. 
The proposed methods in [4]-[6] have the same weak point, the user must look at the screen until the 
authentication is successful. Because the method uses a virtual keyboard and the screen is small, if the user is 
not looking on the screen while tapping, the user will not be able to login successfully. This method also 
suffers from shoulder surfing attacks. For the proposed method in [3], the user does not need to look at the 
screen when loging in, unlike [4]-[6]. However, in public places, using only the number of fingers per tap as 
an authentication is not enough to prevent shoulder surfing attacks. When comparing only functions of the 
Rhythmprint authentication with [2]-[6], we found that the Rhythmprint authentication provides higher 
security than others methods.  
In this paper, we provide an empirical assessment of the security performance of the Rhythmprint 
authentication in terms of shoulder surfing and eavesdropping attacks . The results of experiments are 
compared with the traditional keystroke authentication. 
 
 
2. RESEARCH METHOD 
This research attempts to measure the Rhythmprint authentication [1] security in terms of shoulder 
surfing and eavesdropping attacks by comparing to  a traditional keystroke authentication. We implemented 
all authentication programs for the Rhythmprint authentication and the traditional keystroke methods on 
laptops. For the experimental design, we simulate the situation where the user must authenticate 
himself/herself to an application on a laptop while sitting in a public place and an attacker stands behind the 
user. The attacker stands behind the user all the time while the user is trying to authenticate himself/herself to 
application on a laptop using the Rhythmprint authentication and the traditional keystroke authentication.  
For each method, the user must try to authenticate 10 times, the attacker has to perform shoulder 
surfing and eavesdropping attacks everytime. The user enters the password on the keyboard for the traditional 
keystroke authentication and makes the rhythm on the touchpad  for the Rythmpring authentication. 
Everytime the user can authenticate success fully,  we test whether or not the attacker is able to authenticate 
on the victim’s laptop.  The results are recorded. Figure 3 shows the simulated situation of shoulder surfing 
attacks. We design the experiment using two methods including with a hand covering and no hands covering 





Figure 3. The shoulder surfing attack situation 
 
 
2.1. Hand covering 
We allow the user to use the other hand to cover the touching hand when tapping on the touchpad or 
stroking the keyboard. Figure 4 shows when the user tries  to authenticate to the applicaiton on a laptop with 
the traditional keystroke method with hand covering and Figure 5 shows when the user tries to authenticate to 
the applicaiton on a laptop with the Rhthmprint method  and uses the hand to cover. 
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Figure 4. The traditional keystroke authentication 
with hand covering 
 




2.2. No hand covering 
We do not allow the user to use the other hand to cover the touching hand when tapping on the 
touchpad or stroking the keyboard. Figure 6 shows when the user tries to authenticate to the applicaiton on a 
laptop with the traditional keystroke method without hand covering and Figure 7 shows when the user tries to 





Figure 6. The traditional keystroke without hand 
covering authentication 
 




3. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
For verifying our proposed method, we designed and developed software on a laptop uisng Java 
programming language. For a laptop in our experiment, we used Macbook Pro by Apple Inc. We recruited 10 
participants which consists of  five males and five females, between 30-40 and one male as an attacker.  
All users must authenticate themselves to the application on our laptop 10 times per method, while 
the attacker is standing behind them. Each time the authentication is complete, the attacker tries to 
authenticate himself on the victim’s laptop. The experiment is divided into two parts including hand covering 
and no hands covering experiments. 
 
3.1. Hand covering experimental results 
While users were tapping on the screen or stroking the keyboard to authenticate themselves ,  we 
allowed users to use the other hand to cover the tapping hand. Table 1 shows the experimental results of this 
method. 
From Table 1, we can calculate the security performance of the Rhythmprint method comparing to 
the traditional keystroke method by using arithmetic mean  x   and S.D. (standard deviation).  
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Table 1. Hand Cover Experimental Results 
User Attack Success T ime  
Rhythmprint  Keystroke 
1 0 7 
2 0 0 
3 0 8 
4 9 9 
5 0 0 
6 0 5 
7 0 7 
8 8 9 
9 0 9 
10 0 0 
 
 
3.2. No hand covering experimental results 
  While users were tapping on the screen or stroking the keyboard to authenticate themselves, users 
were not allowed to use the other hand to cover the tapping or the typing hand. Table 2 shows the 
experimental results of this method.  
From Table 2, we can calculate the security performance of Rhythmprint method comparing to the 
traditional keystroke method by using arithmetic mean  x   and S.D. (standard deviation). 
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x  of the traditional keystroke is  
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The experimetal results show the security performance of the Rhythmprint authentication comparing 
to the traditional keystroke authentication. In the hand covering method case, only 2 of 10 volunteers of the 
Rhythmprint authentication were attacked successfully and the minimum t ime to crack the victim’s rhythm is 
8, but 7 of 10 of the traditional keystroke authentions were attacked and the minimum time to crack victim’s 
stroke is 5. The x  and S.D. of the experiment in this case show that the Rhythmprint authentication provides 
higher security than traditional keystroke. In the no hand covering method case, only 4 of 10 volunteers of 
the Rhythmprint authentication were attacked successfully and the minimum time to crack victim’s rhythm is 
7, while all of the traditional keystroke authentications were attacked and the minimum time to crack victim 
stroke is 1. The x  and S.D. of the experiment in this case show that the Rhythmprint authentication also 
provides higher security than the traditional keystroke. 
 
 
Table 2. No. Hand Cover Experimental Results 
User Attack Success T ime  
Rhythmprint  Keystrike 
1 0 3 
2 8 5 
3 0 4 
4 0 2 
5 7 4 
6 0 3 
7 7 5 
8 0 1 
9 9 7 




From the experimeatal results, we can conclude the Rhythmprint  authentication provides higher 
security than the traditional keystroke authentication in terms of shoulder surfing and eavesdropping attacks. 
For the Rhythmprint authentication, when the user touches or tabs on the touchpad, it does not make a loud 
sound. Therefore, eavesdropping attacks is unlikely. However, the traditional keystroke authentication can 
suffer from eavesdropping attacks  if the user is not careful when typing on the buttons.  
For the shoulder surfing attacks, since the Rhythmprint authentication does not require any button 
and any fixed position on the touchpad, the user can touch the finger on the touchpad without looking at the 
touchpad and can use the other hand to cover while touching. However, the traditional keystroke 
authentication requires the buttons which are located at fixed positions. As a result, the user must be able to 
see keyboard while making strokes for authentication. If the user uses the other hand to cover the stroking 
hand, the user can perform the task more slowly which can be easily detected by an attacker. The experiment 
shows that if the users tried to authenticate in a public place without anything covering the stroking hand in 
the traditional keystroke authentication, the users were attacked 100% of the time. However, only 4 of 10 
volunteers of the Rhythmprint authentication were attacked successfully and the minimum time to crack a 
victim rhythm is 7. 
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